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In conclusion, Law and the Great Plains, which has provided a
glimpse of the law in the region, will greatly stimulate the interest of legal
historians. As the editor fully realizes, to ascertain the real nature of law
on the Great Plains, we need a larger sampling of various studies on the
region, especially during the late nineteenth century. Let's hope that
Wunder will organize similar conferences periodically to provide scholars
opportunities to thoroughly exploit the area and deepen our understanding
of the subject that will highlight the differences (rather than the similari-
ties) between the Great Plains and the rest of the United States.
YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA
University of Texas at El Paso
CHARLES F. HOBSON, ed., The Papers of John Marshall, vol viii:
Correspondence, Papers, and Selected Judicial Opinions, March 1814-
December 1819. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
xxxvii, 421 pp. $50.00.
This volume covers March 1814 until December 1819 of the papers,
correspondence and selected judicial opinions of Chief Justice John
Marshall. Selected opinions include constitutional cases decided in the
Supreme Court and representative nonconstitutional cases adjudicated
there and in the Circuit Courts for Virginia and North Carolina. One finds
opinions in such constitutional milestones as Dartmouth College v.
Woodward (1819) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), opinions (for the
Court and in dissent) in two prize cases raising important issues of inter-
national law, and opinions in several commercial controversies addressing
such eminently practical questions as creditors' priorities and the applica-
tion of Virginia's recording statute to liens on personal property (here,
slaves). Papers include the series of articles Marshall published anony-
mously in defense of his opinion for the Court in McCulloch and litigation
documents that Marshall drafted in cases in which he was interested, but
from which he had recused himself. Since little of the correspondence sur-
vives, it provides only a glimpse of Marshall the man, mostly looking
after wayward sons and otherwise attending to his extended family.
The excellent editorial notes provide a nuanced account of the con-
text of the documentary material and break some new interpretive ground.
A theme to this volume is that of judicial federalism-controversy about
the authority of the Supreme Court over state judiciaries and ultimately
the reach of federal law. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816), the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, providing
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over state judiciaries on mat-
ters of federal law. Although recusing himself because of his family's
financial interest in the lands whose ownership was in dispute, Marshall
drafted the writ appealing the Virginia Supreme Court's finding of uncon-
stitutionality and drafted an argument for use by counsel, a surviving frag-
ment of which is published here for the first time.
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The Virginia Supreme Court's holding of unconstitutionality
stemmed from its refusal to follow the mandate of an earlier Supreme
Court case that upheld Marshall's title by finding that the subject property
had not escheated to Virginia before the Jay Treaty of 1794 protected it.
Marshall fretted about the basis for the Court's ruling for reasons that
became apparent in Martin. Since the ruling depended not only on the
treaty (federal law) but on whether the lands had escheated before the
treaty (state law), Marshall feared that Virginia courts would not perceive
themselves bound to follow the Court's judgement. He had hoped that the
Court would base its decision on the Treaty of Peace of 1783, rendering
irrelevant the interpretation of subsequent state laws.
The battle that Marshall was not anxious to fight-as interested
party rather than judge-came to fruition in Martin. In the surviving frag-
ment, Marshall argues that the power to decide a case in which construc-
tion of a treaty has been called into question "must necessarily constitute
the component parts of a case arising <un>der a treaty" (p. 122). He asks,
"Must not the title of the party at the time the treaty <was> made be exam-
ined for the purpose of determining on the appli<cability> of the treaty to
this case" (p. 122)? Nevertheless, given Marshall's concern about the
basis of the Court's original decision, he had to be aware of the problem-
atic character of his answer: "if in the opinion of this court the treaty does
protect his title, <then> the state court in deciding otherwise has miscon-
strued the treaty" (p. 122). Logic alone simply does not compel the con-
clusion that any error by the state courts must lie in their construction of
the treaty rather than in the state law determining title apart from the
treaty.
Judicial federalism also informs the discussion of Dartmouth
College. The central argument in the New Hampshire Supreme Court was
whether the college was a public institution whose charter was subject to
continuing legislative control or a private institution possessed of vested
rights immune from legislative interference. Deciding that the college was
essentially public and that its charter had vested no private rights, the
court allowed the legislature's substantial amendment of the charter.
Appealing the case to the Supreme Court of the United States required
finding a federal ground under which the Court might invoke its appellate
jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act. By that route, the claim
that the charter's amendment violated the contract clause of the
Constitution became the legal issue in the Supreme Court, where it had
figured only incidentally in the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Although Daniel Webster based his argument for reversal on the
doctrine of vested rights as "a general principle of our government" (p.
220) and on provisions in the New Hampshire Constitution, Justice Story,
originally undecided on the merits, regretted "that we were so stinted in
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, that half the argument could not be met
and enforced" (p. 220). Counsel to the trustees scrambled to get several
cognate suits brought in Story's Circuit Court and certified to the
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Supreme Court in time for the anticipated reargument of the main case. In
a diversity case appealed from a federal Circuit Court, the decision might
legitimately rest on the doctrine of vested rights despite its lack of incor-
poration into an express federal constitutional provision.
Confounding expectations, Marshall announced the Court's opinion
before the expected reargument. While reading the contract clause broad-
ly to protect vested rights in a case that he conceded was not within the
immediate contemplation of the framers of that clause, Marshall limited
the decision's potential impact. He reversed on the narrower issue of fed-
eral law, rather than assert the Court's authority to reverse the state
court's interpretation of the vested rights doctrine or its own constitution.
Dartmouth thus established more limited Supreme Court review of
statutes purporting to interfere with private rights when the court exer-
cised its appellate jurisdiction over the state courts.
Marshall also saw McCulloch primarily as a case about federal judi-
cial power. The constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States
was largely a foregone conclusion. More contentious than the result was
the Court's authority to declare the scope of federal legislative power.
Marshall's primary concern was to establish the Court's role in protecting
Congress' wide latitude to exercise its enumerated powers. His focus was
on assuring that Congress might effectively exercise the powers expressly
given it by the Constitution rather than on reading those powers expan-
sively. As the criticism of McCulloch focused less on Congress than on
the Court, in anticipation of pending battles over internal improvements
and slavery in the territories, it moved Marshall to publish his anonymous
defense of the opinion. He conceived this defense ultimately as one of the
Court itself, challenging his critics to show how one might lawfully sus-
tain the Bank without adopting the Court's reasoning.
The picture that emerges from this volume is of Marshall's primary
concern that legislative or judicial power, narrowly construed, would
practically amount to no power at all. Just as jurisdiction to apply a treaty
required authority to dispose of the case to the extent that the Court saw it
affected by the treaty, the exercise of enumerated powers required author-
ity to choose means to the extent that Congress saw them as necessary to
the exercise of those powers. The Court's primary role was to delineate
the spheres within which the exercise of power or jurisdiction was
absolute, but it did not follow that those spheres were without ascertain-
able limits. That Marshall was able to enact this practical vision into
law-to assimilate essentially political choices touching on highly contro-
versial issues to the familiar judicial role displayed in the more ordinary
cases also illustrated in this volume-remains Marshall's most enduring
achievement.
JAMES L. KAINEN
Fordham University School of Law
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